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Abstract  
 
 
A considerable body of work has invoked learning in seeking to explain observed patterns of 
EU policy change. This paper scrutinizes the relevance of learning for understanding policy 
outcomes. We apply a consolidated framework based on factual, experiential and constructiv-
ist learning across the individual and organizational levels to examine the unlikely policy out-
come of dedicating 20% of the EU 2014-2020 budget to climate action. Learning did play 
some role in the policy outcome, in that the belief that climate policy integration (CPI) was an 
appropriate instrument to address climate change was the result of constructivist learning over 
the preceding decade. However, this learning was restricted to a handful of policy entrepre-
neurs in the Cabinet/DG Clima, who largely “pushed” the policy through based on pre-
existing convictions. Conversely, beyond some experiential learning, there is little evidence 
that learning was a significant feature of the policy process amongst actors in other European 
institutions. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
The past two decades have witnessed growing interest in the role of learning in policy and 
politics – where learning is typically understood as a process of updating knowledge, under-
standing and beliefs. Learning has been invoked to explain changes in political agendas, the 
choice of policies and instruments, as well as the dynamics of organizational processes and 
strategies (Bomberg 2007; Feindt 2010; Kamkhaji and Radaelli 2016; Koch and Lindenthal 
2011). Underlying this interest in learning is increased recognition of the role of knowledge, 
beliefs and ideas in policy processes (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013; Nye 1987; Radaelli 1995). 
The idea of learning is certainly a seductive, even convenient, one. It offers a positive model 
of human agency predicated on transformative change through information, critical reflection 
and value change. Moreover, learning provides scholars with a range of mechanisms to ac-
count for policy change, which cannot readily be explained by recourse to conventional ex-
planations such as coercion (Radaelli 2009).  
Yet the assumed role of learning in policy change has come in for growing criti-
cism. Methodologically, critiques have focused on the tendency of researchers to privilege 
learning, as opposed to non-learning (avoiding to learn) or no learning in the policy process 
(Egan 2009; Radaelli 2009). They have also drawn attention to the difficulty of distinguishing 
learning from other possible explanations of change (Dunlop and Radaelli 2016; Zito and 
Schout 2009). The literature has also been criticized conceptually for its diverse, overlapping 
terminology. To this list, we would add two further critiques of our own. First, previous stud-
ies have not always adopted a very precise, or even demanding, definition of learning. The re-
sult is considerable analytical ambiguity as to what does, and does not, qualify as learning. 
Second, too much of the existing literature on learning has exclusively focused on policy pro-
cesses or organizational change, leaving unanswered questions about the degree to which 
learning actually matters for policy outcomes. 
This contribution addresses some of these shortcomings. First, we seek to bring ana-
lytical clarity to the literature on learning, adopting a more stringent definition of learning that 
goes beyond the mere act of accumulating new information. Additionally, departing from the 
various typologies dominating recent work (e.g. Heikkila and Gerlak 2013; Zito and Schout 
2009), we draw on foundational concepts in the learning literature to distinguish between ge-
neric types and levels of learning. Second, we move beyond a simple focus on the incidence 
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of learning, to additionally examine the connection between learning and policy outcomes. A 
major question we ask is whether the concept of learning provides explanatory value, over 
and above other possible factors, in accounting for empirically observed patterns of policy 
change. 
Empirically, we examine the case of mainstreaming climate finance into the Euro-
pean Union (EU) budget. This makes a good test case within the present context in that the 
literature frequently asserts that learning plays an important role in environmental and climate 
policy integration (EPI/CPI). Underlying its assumed significance is the idea that EPI/CPI is 
underpinned by new knowledge, and stronger forms of integration are likely to require chang-
es in beliefs about the importance of climate change and/or the goals of policy intervention 
(Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007; Jordan and Lenschow 2010). Indeed, addressing climate change 
through a non-trivial allocation of the EU budget to CPI measures marked a significant depar-
ture from the status quo, suggesting an important role for learning in the reframing of policy 
objectives and the adoption of an innovative policy response. The rest of the paper proceeds 
as follows. Section two reviews different ways in which learning has been conceptualized, 
while section three highlights some of the challenges involved in using the concept of learn-
ing to explain policy change. Our analytical framework is developed in section four and sec-
tion five illustrates the role of learning in the case of integrating climate finance into the EU 
budget. Discussion and conclusions are presented in sections six and seven, respectively.   
 
  
LEARNING, POLICY AND CAUSALITY   
  
Recent work in political science has typically approached learning in one of two different 
ways.3 One is as a theoretical lens (or approach) to guide analysis of the policy process (e.g. 
Dunlop and Radaelli 2013; Dunlop and Radaelli 2016), while the other is as a largely empiri-
cal phenomenon where the emphasis is on analyzing the presence (or absence) of learning 
(e.g., by Nilsson 2005; Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007; Schout 2009). Our contribution in the 
present article resides within this latter set of studies although, as explained below, it advanc-
es beyond a simple binary analysis to interrogate the “quality” of learning. 
The existing literature has, implicitly or explicitly, invoked learning in at least three 
                                                 3 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this distinction. 
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different ways in seeking to understand policy change. First, learning has been deployed as a 
causal factor in policy outcomes. That is, it is assumed that, as a result of a process of learn-
ing, new (or revised) policies are demanded, searched for, adopted and possibly implemented 
(Schout 2009). In this sense, learning precedes policy change, and can be conceptualized as an 
explanatory variable in its own right. A second way in which learning has been invoked is as 
a conditioning (or intervening) variable. More specifically, learning is assumed to enable 
and/or facilitate policy change by changing the frames, processes and strategies through 
which individuals and organizations interpret information and policy challenges, and their re-
sponses to them (Braun 2009; Dunlop 2010; Farrell 2009; Koch and Lindenthal 2011; Zito 
and Schout 2009). Again, learning is causal, although its influence operates in conjunction 
with other explanatory variables. A third way learning has been invoked is as an intentional or 
unintentional consequence of policy change (e.g., by Nilsson 2005; Nilsson and Eckerberg 
2007). In fact, learning may be one of the objectives of a policy, and therefore the relevant 
output from a particular policy change (e.g. Dunlop 2015). 
In reality, the distinction between these three applications may be less clear cut and 
unidirectional than the above typology suggests. While learning may propel or facilitate poli-
cy change, policy change itself may lead to learning, with the result that learning and policy 
change can be seen as part of an iterative cycle. Still, the three-fold typology of learning as an 
independent/explanatory, intervening or dependent variable remains useful in seeking to em-
pirically understand the relationship between policy change and learning, which has often 
been ambiguous in the literature. It is also useful in evaluating the significance of different 
forms of learning. 
Regardless of whether learning is approached as a driver, an input or output, a 
common assumption is that learning is important (Bennett and Howlett 1992; Zito and Schout 
2009). To begin with, learning is assumed to matter because the external or internal demands 
for change depend on whether and how actors conceive a particular issue as worthy of policy 
attention. Another way in which learning is believed to matter is by shaping the response to 
these demands, whether in terms of organizational behavior and strategy or policy outputs. 
Regarding the former, learning is conceptualized as influencing the routines, problem-solving 
capabilities and goal orientation of organizations (Heikkila and Gerlak 2013; March and 
Olsen 1975). The importance of learning for policy stems from its hypothesized role in influ-
encing the potential choice set, appropriateness and selection of regulatory approaches, in-
struments and how these are articulated in practice (Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007; Radaelli 
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2009). 
CAVEATS TO LEARNING 
  
While learning has been widely invoked, there is a danger in exaggerating its incidence and 
substantive importance (Radaelli 2009; Zito and Schout 2009). One reason to be cautious is 
that there may be other explanations for policy change. Learning could be interpreted as the 
dominant causal explanation if it were primarily responsible for generating the impetus for a 
new or revised policy. Yet a particular outcome might have come about regardless of learn-
ing. A coalition of actors with similar pre-existing interests may arrive at a policy outcome, 
for example, by commanding the majority of votes in a parliament or committee. Likewise, a 
policy outcome could arise without learning where policy entrepreneurs (Béland and Cox 
2015; Steinebach and Knill 2016) with established knowledge and beliefs ‘push things 
through’ (Bürgin 2015), using their energies, skills and acumen (Kingdon 1995). A second 
reason to be cautious is that actors simply may not learn. Although exposed to new infor-
mation, ideas and values, they may choose to ignore these, and carry on as usual. This may 
occur where actors consciously engage in non-learning because it is not in their interests to 
change their beliefs and actions, or where they unconsciously engage in defensive avoidance 
by filtering out new information (Janis and Mann 1977; Koch and Lindenthal 2011; Lindblom 
1979; May 1992).  
Another caveat is that actors may well learn, but there is no guarantee that this will 
translate into substantive organizational change and/or policy outputs. Organizational barriers, 
embedded interests, past policy commitments and institutionalized routines can prevent indi-
viduals or organizations that have learnt from realizing their ambitions (Egan 2009). Parlia-
ments, upper houses or actors such as lobbyists can ‘block’ proposals, inhibiting policy 
change in response to altered knowledge, understanding and beliefs. Indeed, the literature 
suggests that the ability of actors to achieve their ambitions, goals and values animated by 
learning processes depends on their authority, capabilities and opportunity structures. Policy 
entrepreneurs – actors who seek to affect significant policy change by actively developing, 
promoting and defending innovative policy ideas (Braun 2009; Mintrom 2013) – may play an 
important role within this context. Of particular relevance for learning, policy entrepreneurs 
can serve as ‘teachers’ (Bomberg 2007), contributing to changes in other actors’ knowledge, 
political skills and underlying beliefs through interaction, engagement and stimulating critical 
reflection. 
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A fourth reason to be cautious about learning is methodological (Radaelli 2009). It 
can be very challenging to disentangle the influence of learning from other factors. This is be-
cause several factors may act in combination to affect change. Yet it also reflects the possibil-
ity that learning processes that inform, guide and propel policy change may precede the deci-
sion to adopt a new or revised policy by a long time. This raises identification issues, both in 
the sense of identifying learning, which may have taken place historically, as well as attrib-
uting subsequent policy change to this learning. These identification issues are aggravated by 
the fact that any attempt to qualify the existence or relevance of learning requires a corre-
sponding micro-level, socially-embodied approach, wherein the units of analysis comprise ac-
tors involved in policy change. Locating these individuals, and securing interviews with them, 
is not always straightforward. Moreover, uncovering learning and respondents’ true motives 
for particular courses of action is fraught with problems, particularly because self-reported ac-
counts of learning may be subject to bias (Radaelli 2009). 
 
 
UNPACKING AND DETECTING LEARNING   
 
Given these challenges, an essential starting point for any evaluation is a precise definition of 
learning, which can be operationalized to determine its empirical existence. To this end, we 
turn to foundational work, which places considerable emphasis on the essentially reflexive na-
ture of learning. In particular, these contributions treat learning as an active process of change, 
rather than a passive one of incorporation (Argyris and Schön 1978; Janis and Mann 1977; 
March and Olsen 1975; Sabatier 1987). In order for learning to occur, we posit that the fol-
lowing must take place: (1) a reflection and judgment based on an input, experience or detec-
tion of error, which leads the individual to select a different view on (2) how things happen, 
i.e. the acquisition of knowledge or learning facts and (3) what course of action to take, i.e. 
the reflection on individual or collective experience or advise from others on such previous 
experiences (based on Argyris and Schön 1978; Bennett and Howlett 1992; May 1992). In 
adopting this definition, our work differs from a number of previous studies on learning, 
which have included in their conception of learning the simple act of acquiring information 
and experience, without any reflection or change in behavior.  
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            Adopting this more stringent definition of learning is important for two reasons. One 
is that, in deciphering policy change, it reduces the risk of spurious causality. If learning is re-
sponsible for policy change, it is logical that actors should have altered their behavior, choices 
and actions in response to and reflecting on new information, experiences and insights, or 
sought to do so. A second reason is that a more discriminating definition and typology of 
learning renders the concept ultimately more useful. An over-inclusive definition and multi-
tude of overlapping learning types potentially renders learning ubiquitous and, in certain cas-
es, fairly meaningless as an analytic concept to explain policy change. Raising the bar of what 
constitutes learning (an active process) helps to analytically distinguish learning from other 
processes with more passive aspects. 
We also depart from a number of typologies, which have come to dominate recent 
work in learning. Amongst others, these have drawn a distinction between political learning, 
social learning, policy learning, and instrumental learning (e.g. Bennett and Howlett 1992; 
Bomberg 2007; Braun 2009; Feindt 2010; May 1992; Sabatier 1987; Schout 2009). These 
learning types are useful in categorizing and analyzing learning in particular contexts, for ex-
ample, learning focused on policy instruments and changing organizational strategies. How-
ever, in evaluating learning that shapes policy outcomes, we suggest that it is useful to distin-
guish between three different generic categories, which seek to capture what is learnt, and 
how: (1) factual learning; (2) experiential learning and (3) constructivist learning. An ad-
vantage of doing so is that it allows us to go beyond a simple preoccupation with document-
ing whether learning takes place or the ends its serves (e.g. changing political strategies or 
policy settings). Instead, by drawing a distinction between forms (or modes) of learning (e.g. 
Dunlop and Radaelli 2013), we are better able to say something about its nature and relevance 
for policy change. In particular, different forms of learning might be expected to play differ-
ent roles in policy change, and potentially have greater or lesser impact in shaping outcomes.  
Both factual and experiential learning fall into the category of what we could call 
‘normal’ learning, which commonly takes place as a routine part of policymaking processes. 
Factual learning involves an increase in scientific, technical or policy/organizational 
knowledge, coupled with reflection on this knowledge (Argyris and Schön 1978; Haas and 
Haas 1995). Experiential learning takes place when actors reflect on their own working expe-
rience within the context of a particular activity or as part of an organization. A key aspect of 
experiential learning is learning how the policymaking system works and becoming skilled at 
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using tactics to influence policy. It is closely aligned with notions of ‘political learning’ (May 
1992; Radaelli 2009) and ‘policy-oriented’ learning (Sabatier 1987). Many aspects of single-
/double loop learning (Argyris and Schön 1978) also fall within the experiential learning cate-
gory. Constructivist learning occurs when underlying beliefs change, resulting in a different 
view of how the individual or organization ‘sees things’, together with a (potentially) new 
normative understanding of how things ‘ought to be’ (Nye 1987). We categorize constructiv-
ist learning as a form of complex learning because it may contribute to more discontinuous 
policy shifts, as actors form different understandings of relevant problems, solutions and nor-
mative obligations.  
We conceptualize these different learning types as occurring on two levels: the indi-
vidual level and the organizational level. The former refers to learning by individual actors 
(e.g. specific officials), whilst the latter relates to learning at the level of organizations (e.g. 
national government ministry). The organizational level begins when learning becomes col-
lective in nature and is progressively institutionalized into the cognitive, operational and nor-
mative fabric, behaviors and roles of a particular organization. Within the present context, or-
ganizational learning may be evident once a particular policy or agenda – promoted by partic-
ular individuals – becomes part of an organization’s goals, official position and/or negotiating 
stance. The individual and organizational levels are interdependent and influenced by wider 
societal developments. The activities of individual policy entrepreneurs can influence learning 
on the organizational level or even animate entrepreneurial activities by organizations (Braun 
2009). 
Table 1 summarizes our typology and highlights key criteria to identify the different 
learning types in an empirical setting. 
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Table 1. Criteria for identifying learning in the policy process. Source: Authors. 
 
 Factual learning      Experiential learning    Constructivist learning  
Individual level  Individual actors have 
acquired (e.g. from stud-
ies) and reflected on new 
information; increased 
knowledge and expertise 
deployed by actors in 
their task environment. 
Active engagement with par-
ticular issue through direct 
experience and reflecting on 
successes and failures to en-
hance actors’ existing politi-
cal or bureaucratic practices 
and competencies. 
Changed personal norms, 
values or policy beliefs; 
underpins new and/or rein-
forced personal commit-
ments and actions. 
Organizational 
level  
 
New knowledge is ac-
quired by and transmitted 
through an organization; 
reflection, incorporation 
and use of knowledge in 
organizational activities 
and/or to inform organi-
zational position. 
Critical reflection on existing 
practices and performances 
within context of existing 
organizational goals; the ac-
companying development 
and/or refinement of new or-
ganizational processes, strat-
egies and behaviors.  
Change in organizational 
beliefs and values over 
time; institutionalization of 
normative beliefs, the re-
framing of organizational 
goals and discontinuous 
organizational action. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
In order to evaluate the influence of learning on policy change, we apply the framework in-
troduced above to the empirical case of integrating climate finance into the EU 2014-2020 
Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) budget by dedicating 20 per cent to climate-
related expenditures. The time frame of analysis is a decade between 2003 and 2013. The 
analysis is based on 35 interviews with key actors at the European Commission (7 from the 
Directorate General [DG]/Cabinet Climate Action [Clima], 3 from DG Environment, 7 from 
DG/Cabinet Energy and 6 from DG/Cabinet Agriculture and Rural Development), the Euro-
pean Parliament (Members of the European Parliament [MEPs]) and from EU member states 
(civil servants at the Permanent Representations of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK). The sampling strategy involved locating actors who 
played an important role in initiating, drafting, negotiating and voting on the legislative pro-
posal. Interviews were transcribed, coded and analyzed according to the conceptual frame-
work.  
Our reasoning for believing that learning might be a central explanatory variable in the 
policy innovation of mainstreaming climate finance is two-fold. The first is that mainstream-
ing represented a major policy shift and, moreover, one likely to have required significant 
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changes in individual and collective understandings of policy challenges and solutions. Previ-
ous work has ascribed an important role for learning in accounting for such paradigm shifts in 
policy (Hall 1993; Feindt 2010). A second is existing scholarship on CPI/EPI. In particular, it 
is suggested that stronger forms of integration demand new understandings of and normative 
commitments towards climate/environmental protection, pointing to a need for not only nor-
mal forms of learning, but also more complex, constructivist modes (Nilsson and Eckerberg 
2007; Jordan and Lenschow 2010).  
  
INTEGRATING CLIMATE FINANCE INTO THE EU BUDGET  
 
In the wake of the EU MFF 2014-2020 negotiations, DG Clima introduced a proposal to dedi-
cate 20 per cent of the EU budget to CPI measures (European Commission 2011). This 
marked a novel ‘mainstreaming’ approach to focus on co-benefits of climate protection and 
sustainable economic growth in the area of climate finance. It was based on the concept of 
EPI used in the Cardiff Process in the early 2000s and was motivated by the ‘public money 
for public goods’ rationale of linking public funds to addressing pressing challenges such as 
climate change (Interview EC414; EC18; EC23). The public goods rationale was also a driv-
ing factor of the parallel reform proposals for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  
One interpretation of the ‘20 per cent’ policy innovation in the 2014-2020 budget 
could have been learning. Indeed, evidence from the interviews provided some support for the 
idea that learning played a role in the mainstreaming of climate considerations within the EU 
budget, including constructivist learning. Two distinct types of constructivist learning were 
important in this respect. The first was constructivist learning on climate change wherein in-
dividuals working for the European institutions (Commission, Parliament and Council) 
formed beliefs about the existence of climate change and recognized it as a policy problem 
which needed to be addressed. This learning took place amongst different sets of actors at dif-
ferent times. Many individuals, especially at Cabinet/DG Clima, formed normative “green” 
beliefs regarding the importance of environmental protection and climate mitigation decades 
ago, e.g. by growing up in the countryside or being active in environmental movements 
(EC13; EC14; EC15; EC17; MEP2; MS53). Another set of individuals engaged in construc-
tivist learning on climate change during the 1990s and 2000s through their involvement in de-
                                                 
4 European Commission 
5 Member state 
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veloping and negotiating climate change policies at the national and/or European level – while 
working, for example, for national environment ministries or DG Environment (EC3; EC6; 
EC8; EC16). A further group of individuals based across the European institutions who was 
involved in negotiating the MFF mostly engaged in constructivist learning on climate change 
in the mid-2000s in line with wider society when climate change entered the public debate. 
Amongst others, the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, Al Gore’s documen-
tary ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ and the 2007 4th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) were all influential in prompting individuals to reflect on 
this input and subsequently form new personal commitments to support action on climate 
change (EC3; EC18; EC19; EC20).  
Constructivist learning on climate change also manifested itself on the organizational 
level of the European Commission in the form of normative policy goals and official negotiat-
ing positions. Since the early 1990s, the European Commission incorporated knowledge on 
climate change, which subsequently informed its organizational strategies. Over time, the Eu-
ropean Commission formed the normative belief that climate change needs to be addressed. 
This was institutionalized in the form of a Climate Directorate inside DG Environment with 
the organizational mission of developing and promoting climate policies. The Climate Direc-
torate was upgraded in 2009 to DG Clima with a dedicated European Commissioner. It is im-
portant to note that constructivist learning on climate change predominantly occurred between 
the 1970s and 2000s, that is, before the policy process of integrating climate objectives into 
the EU budget.  
A second aspect of constructivist learning directly linked with climate mainstreaming 
in the EU budget was constructivist learning on CPI itself. A new commitment and belief 
emerged that CPI was an appropriate policy instrument to address climate change. This policy 
innovation was pioneered by a small number of individuals working at Cabinet/DG Clima. 
They were motivated by strong personal convictions, i.e. previously formed climate change-
related beliefs, and supported Cabinet/DG Clima’s organizational objective to address climate 
change (EC14; EC15; EC20). There are three reasons why these individuals, and the Cabi-
net/DG itself, focused on CPI as a favored policy solution. Economic austerity measures in 
response to the Eurozone crisis reduced political willingness to support strong climate policies 
(EC12; EC17). This made transferring individual beliefs on addressing climate change and 
achieving Cabinet/DG Clima’s organizational objectives difficult. In search of opportunities 
to advance Cabinet/DG Clima’s organizational objectives, a small group of individuals re-
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flected on their involvement in the Cardiff process on EPI in the early 2000s, therefore engag-
ing in constructivist learning. They concluded that mainstreaming environmental objectives 
could serve as a blueprint to integrate climate change measures into other policy areas (EC13; 
EC18).  Following a process of convincing key individuals within Cabinet/DG Clima, this be-
lief was institutionalized. Cabinet/DG Clima recognized the MFF as an opportunity for ad-
vancing its organizational objective and hence, “the best vehicle we could find for main-
streaming into other policies (…). [It] was a really big thing. Because it sets the parameters 
for the EU’s spending programmes until 2020” (EC15).  
Co-ordination and co-operation with other Cabinets/DGs was crucial as CPI in the 
MFF was not a policy proposal in its own right, but consisted of interventions into other Cab-
inet/DGs’ domains, frequently resulting in resistance at the policy drafting stages (EC14; 
EC15). These issues were not resolved, but carried ‘up the hierarchy’ into the European 
Commissioners meeting (College of Commissioners). There was insufficient opportunity for 
actors outside Cabinet/DG Clima to engage with and reflect on the CPI aspects of the MFF 
proposal. Cabinet/DG Clima representatives used negotiation tactics to include wording on 
dedicating 20 per cent of the MFF budget to measures co-benefitting climate action. They act-
ed as passionate policy entrepreneurs, pushing “it through because we saw the political oppor-
tunity that this budget could look different if it had a headline target that sold it as a green, 
more modern, innovation-based EU budget (…). Given that we had a 2020 [climate] target 
(…), we had to reflect that into the budget otherwise there was a disconnect” (EC15). The de-
cision in the College of Commissioners emerged because the Commissioner for Climate Ac-
tion can be regarded as policy entrepreneur. She built political momentum, “was very persua-
sive” (EC15) and convinced other decision-makers using a combination of experience, exper-
tise and political acumen (EC16). 
 Similar to the negotiations in the College of Commissioners, Cabinet/DG Clima repre-
sentatives were not necessarily ‘teaching’ (Bomberg 2007) other policymakers about CPI in 
the MFF during their negotiations with the Council and Parliament. First, there was limited 
opportunity, as other Cabinets/DGs with their own organizational priorities dominated the 
MFF negotiations. The CPI issue was crowded-out and ignored due to more pressing econom-
ic priorities and remained relatively untouched by the negotiations with the Parliament and 
Council (EC8; EC9). Second, where Cabinet/DG Clima was involved, its representatives used 
bargaining tactics, their own passion and expertise to defend the proposal (EC14; EC15; 
EC16). For belief changes, and thus constructivist learning to occur, a wider discussion, de-
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bate and exchange of ideas would have been necessary among the different European Com-
mission Cabinets/DGs, member states and the Parliament. Yet this discussion did not occur. 
As one member state representative noted, the proposal to dedicate 20 per cent of the EU 
budget to measures with co-benefits for climate action, “didn’t have a huge amount [of atten-
tion in the MFF negotiations. It] (…) was not regularly cited by many member states at all as 
a driving factor or an important reason behind one of their policy positions. (…) DG Agricul-
ture didn’t refer to it that widely” (MS1; also pointed out by EC2; EC18; EC19; MS2).  
Constructivist learning on CPI in the form of valuing CPI as an appropriate policy in-
strument to address climate change would have necessitated a reflection process among mem-
ber states on how climate objectives could be mainstreamed into national budgets. This, in 
turn, would have required the member states to form a position on the issue by reflecting on 
their national interests. However, there was no reflection process among member state repre-
sentatives on the CPI aspects of the proposal in the form of discussions on CPI during the ne-
gotiations. As a consequence, the wider process of updating beliefs on the appropriateness of 
mainstreaming climate objectives into public budgets among member states and MEPs was 
not initiated. Rather, negotiation tactics, political interests and coalition building remained 
dominant. One central actor recalled, “I didn’t see much learning to be honest. (…) You go 
into negotiations with maximum wishes and then you start trading wishes and you come out 
with some results” (EC17). At the same time, policy entrepreneurs did not make use of oppor-
tunities to actively seek to ‘teach’ other actors about the importance of integrating climate ob-
jectives into public finances by offering information and convincing arguments to encourage 
reflection among MEPs and member state representatives. On the contrary, CPI received little 
attention in the negotiations, and rather “slipped through the cracks” (EC17). 
 It is important to note that most individual policy entrepreneurs (Commissioner on 
Climate Action, key members of Cabinet/DG Clima and Cabinet/DG Agriculture) had 
changed or formed their normative beliefs on the importance of addressing climate change be-
fore being involved in the MFF negotiations (EC3; EC9; EC11; EC14; EC18; EC19; MS1; 
MEP2). Individuals across the European institutions who were actively involved in the MFF 
negotiations did engage in experiential learning on how to play political tactics more success-
fully to achieve their objectives (EC17; EC18; EC20; EC21). This was evidenced by the par-
allel negotiations on the EU budget and the CAP reform which, for the first time, involved the 
European Parliament in a trilogue process (Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood 2015) to 
achieve agreement among a small number of representatives from the European institutions. 
14 
 
Actors pointed out that “this is the first big co-decision thing, so the learning was more on 
‘how can we do the co-decision process on such a big file’” (EC17). Cabinet/DG Clima and 
its representatives engaged in factual learning on CPI by expanding their expertise on CPI as 
policy instrument. However, given the limited attention to the climate-mainstreaming pro-
posal in the negotiations within the European Commission and between the European institu-
tions, there was little opportunity for reflection and thus factual learning on CPI outside Cabi-
net/DG Clima. Factual learning on CPI and policy-related facts on the individual and organi-
zational level was also constrained by a lack of time and resources. Interviewees noted that, 
“especially the Parliament was kind of overwhelmed. They did not have enough staff (…), 
[and] they were complaining about this lack of in-depth knowledge” (EC19). Despite these 
challenges, the Parliament engaged in experiential learning in the trilogues by developing new 
organizational practices on participating in such negotiations. These practices were embedded 
in the organizational memory for future MFF negotiations well after individual MEPs left the 
Parliament. 
  
DISCUSSION ON LEARNING IN POLICYMAKING   
  
Our findings (summarized in Table 2) suggest that learning did indeed play a role in the poli-
cy outcome. Yet this learning was highly uneven, took place over different time-scales and its 
actual influence was highly contingent. Much of the learning which took place during the 
MFF negotiations could be predominantly characterized as ‘normal’. In particular, it largely 
comprised experiential learning (as discussed e.g. by Argyris and Schön 1978; May 1992), 
and was the result of individuals’ involvement in the policymaking process. Especially those 
closely involved in the trilogue negotiations actively debated the policy details of the MFF. 
They also reflected on the successes and failures of the negotiation process, which resulted in 
enhanced bureaucratic competencies, and improved negotiation capabilities. Some of the 
learning related to the trilogues was also institutionalized in the organizational practices of the 
Parliament. 
 If the analytical time-frame is extended beyond the period of the MFF negotiations 
(2010-2013), it is apparent that prior constructivist learning regarding climate change played a 
role, in that it placed the issue on the agenda of policy actors. Yet much of this learning oc-
curred before the mid-2000s – and therefore lay outside the ten-year period typically consid-
ered relevant for analyzing the influence of learning (Radaelli 2009). Hence most individuals 
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at the European Commission (and to a lesser extent in the Parliament and Council) formed 
normative beliefs that climate change needed to be addressed long before the MFF process. 
This belief subsequently became institutionalized into their respective organizations, for ex-
ample, as evidenced by the creation of Cabinet/DG Clima.  
 Constructivist learning, which led to beliefs that CPI was the most appropriate policy 
instrument to address climate change, was also important in shaping the policy outcome. Un-
like normative beliefs regarding climate change, learning on CPI itself was more recent, tak-
ing place around 2009/10. However, there is little evidence that actors outside of Cabinet/DG 
Clima, including those from other Cabinets/DGs, the Parliament and Council, engaged in this 
form of constructivist learning. Such learning on CPI would have occurred if they had reflect-
ed on the climate finance proposal and formed beliefs on the value of integrating climate ob-
jectives into budgets as an appropriate policy instrument to achieve co-benefits for climate ac-
tion and economic recovery. Instead, constructivist learning was restricted to a handful of in-
dividuals within Cabinet/DG Clima, and this learning was subsequently incorporated into the 
official position of the organization (i.e. learning on the organizational level). 
 Indeed, pivotal to the mainstreaming of climate objectives into the EU budget was the 
fact that key individuals within Cabinet/DG Clima were dedicated policy entrepreneurs, to-
gether with the absence of strong opposition to the climate finance target as evidenced by a 
lack of discussion on the issue. The particular role of policy entrepreneurs in the present con-
text suggests that only a handful of people may have to engage in learning to achieve a partic-
ular policy goal. If these people have the necessary power, political acumen and knowledge to 
act as policy entrepreneurs (e.g. as in cases illustrated by Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010;  
Braun 2009; Mintrom 2013) Braun 2009; Mintrom 2013), they can ‘push their proposal 
through’ the decision-making process without detailed debate and nurturing learning amongst 
other actors. This finding departs from an often-made assumption that policy change, includ-
ing on CPI (e.g. Nilsson 2005), comes about when multiple actors involved in policymaking 
processes engage in mutual learning and change their beliefs and actions accordingly. 
 The findings that factual and constructivist learning on CPI outside Cabinet/DG Clima 
were fairly limited have implications for subsequent policy developments. The lack of discus-
sion, debate and deliberation on the CPI proposal among member state representatives and 
MEPs could be understood as a missed opportunity to reflect upon information about integrat-
ing climate objectives into national budgets. A discussion among member states and in the 
Parliament, including the provision of information and evidence via the European Commis-
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sion, might have resulted in multiplying effects of learning for policy outcomes: the EU budg-
et could have served as pilot-case from which lessons could be drawn (Rose 1993) and na-
tional policies adapted. It could have also strengthened normative beliefs regarding the im-
portance of climate mitigation and integration measures.  
 Table 2. Overview of learning aspects in the policymaking process for climate mainstreaming 
into the EU budget. Compiled by authors. 
 
 Explanations other 
than learning  
Factual  
learning  
Experiential 
learning  
Constructivist learning  
 
 
 
 
 
Individual 
level 
Key actors at Cabinet/DG 
Clima pushed their pro-
posals through relevant de-
cision-making bodies us-
ing entrepreneurial strate-
gies. The climate main-
streaming proposal was 
not discussed in detail by 
other individuals within 
relevant European institu-
tions. 
Individuals 
were present-
ed with some 
information on 
CPI. Yet lim-
ited reflection 
because it did 
not play a cen-
tral role in de-
bates and MFF 
negotiations. 
Evidence of 
learning-by-
doing amongst 
actors in the 
European 
Commission, 
combined with 
existing expe-
rience in EPI.  
Learning in-
volved how to 
manage 
trilogues as a 
complex nego-
tiation pro-
cess. 
Individuals in Cabinet/DG 
Clima formed beliefs on the 
need to address climate 
change before mid-2000s and 
developed beliefs on CPI as 
useful policy instrument in 
2009/10. Yet there was a lack 
of opportunity to reflect on 
CPI policy innovation among 
individuals outside Cabi-
net/DG Clima, thus no CPI-
related beliefs were formed 
based on MFF negotiations. 
These actors formed beliefs on 
necessity to act on climate 
change prior to or around the 
mid-2000s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organiza-
tional level 
Policy entrepreneurs used 
conventional negotiation 
tactics to achieve their de-
sired policy outcome. Yet 
they did not make explicit 
efforts to ‘teach’ and con-
vince other actors of the 
need for and benefits of 
CPI. Limited reflection oc-
curred amongst member 
states on the climate fi-
nance proposal to consider 
inclusion into national 
budgets, not least because 
they were pre-occupied 
with more pressing eco-
nomic issues in MFF nego-
tiations. 
 
Increased ex-
pertise on CPI 
and evaluation 
tools at Cabi-
net/DG Clima. 
Limited addi-
tional 
knowledge at 
other Cabi-
nets/DGs/ 
member 
states/ Parlia-
ment as 
knowledge on 
CPI was not 
transferred to 
them during 
MFF negotia-
tions. 
Parliament de-
veloped and 
refined 
trilogue nego-
tiation tactics 
and institu-
tionalized 
trilogue expe-
rience into or-
ganizational 
practices to 
remain availa-
ble after indi-
vidual MEPs 
left the Par-
liament. 
 
Beliefs on the need to address 
climate change were institu-
tionalized when the Commis-
sion recognized that climate 
change is a policy problem re-
quiring institutional capacity 
and subsequently set-up the 
Climate Directorate with the 
organizational objective to 
propose climate policies. Cab-
inet/DG Clima interpreted this 
as a mandate to integrate cli-
mate objectives into other pol-
icy areas (CPI) and formed be-
lief that CPI is an appropriate 
policy instrument to address 
climate change. Other actors 
(Parliament, member states, 
other Cabinets/DGs) had little 
opportunity to reflect on CPI 
and thus to form and institu-
tionalize beliefs on usefulness 
of CPI.  
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CONCLUSION   
 
This contribution critically examined the role of learning in EU policy change. Drawing on 
recent critiques and empirical applications (e.g. Heikkila and Gerlak 2013; May 1992; 
Radaelli and Dunlop 2013; Zito and Schout 2009), together with foundational contributions 
on learning (in particular Argyris and Schön 1978; Janis and Mann 1977; March and Olsen 
1975; Nye 1987; Sabatier 1987), we developed a consolidated, analytical framework of learn-
ing. We illustrated this framework based on factual, experiential and constructivist learning 
across the individual and organizational level by applying it to a case of European climate fi-
nance where learning might have been expected to have played an important role.  
Our findings suggest the need for a more nuanced understanding of the role of learn-
ing in policymaking – one that does not deny its role, but acknowledges that learning is multi-
faceted, and occurs unevenly amongst different actors involved in policy processes. Moreo-
ver, our findings suggest that what matters for the policy outcome is who learns, and whether 
these actors have the necessary skills, energies and opportunities to realize their policy ambi-
tions. Within the present case-study, most actors formed beliefs on the importance to act on 
climate change by the mid-2000s, i.e. prior to the MFF reform. Experiential learning on par-
ticipating in trilogue negotiations did take place during the policy process. However, this form 
of ‘normal’ learning was relatively inconsequential in terms of propelling the integration of 
climate objectives. Factual and constructivist learning on CPI as appropriate policy instrument 
remained limited to Cabinet/DG Clima. The main factor underpinning this particular policy 
outcome was the activities of policy entrepreneurs at Cabinet/DG Clima. These individuals 
successfully used various tactics to realize their policy preferences on CPI, which were 
formed as result of constructivist learning in 2009/10. CPI was rarely discussed during the 
MFF negotiations. This resulted in a lack of opportunity for non-Cabinet/DG Clima actors on 
the individual level and among the European institutions to reflect on this policy innovation 
and thus to engage in factual or constructivist learning on CPI. 
Inevitably, our findings need to be qualified. They derive from a single case-study of 
policy change in which CPI was championed by a handful of influential, committed and polit-
ically skilled actors. Furthermore, as with any policy change, deciphering causality within a 
context where the outcome was potentially influenced by multiple factors remains complicat-
ed. Still, with these caveats in mind, our findings have a number of wider implications. One is 
for debates surrounding the explanatory value of learning. Certainly, the concept of learning 
18 
 
enhances our understanding of policy processes and outcomes. Without learning, it would be 
difficult to account for how bureaucratic and political actors gain policy expertise in a particu-
lar field and use this knowledge to formulate advice, advocacy and new or revised policies. It 
would also be difficult to account for how actors become more adept in achieving their objec-
tives, for example, adjusting strategies in response to past failures. Learning may additionally 
help to explain why policy actors select certain policy instruments over others. Indeed, on the 
reading of the present case-study, the value-added of learning would appear to lie in better ac-
counting for how actors gain new knowledge, policy ideas and political strategies. In this 
sense, and returning to the typology outlined earlier, learning can be understood as an inter-
vening variable, which facilitates policy change and the realization of underlying political 
goals. Where the value of learning is less easily discernible is in shaping these goals, at least 
over the time-scales typically considered in policy analysis. Learning may well determine the 
instruments selected to achieve goals. Yet caution is needed in unambiguously situating learn-
ing as an explanatory variable for policy change in its own right, not least because the impetus 
may come from underlying shifts in values and beliefs which take place over much longer 
time periods. 
In drawing these conclusions, our study also highlights the value of disaggregating 
learning into factual, experiential and constructivist categories, acknowledging that learning is 
a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Our typology provides a framework for empirically docu-
menting the incidence of different forms of learning, which precedes and accompanies policy 
change, across three analytically distinct categories. Moreover, disaggregation also better al-
lows us to determine what sorts of learning matter (or do not matter) for the policy outcome, 
and moreover how they matter (or otherwise). Another implication of our findings is that the 
extent of learning can be constrained by the very political dynamics of policy change. The lit-
erature on CPI places considerable store on interaction (e.g. Nilsson 2005; Nilsson and 
Eckerberg 2007). Yet underpinning this model of learning is the assumption that actors al-
ready engaged with a particular policy agenda and associated set of beliefs “teach” others 
(Bomberg 2007). This did not occur in our case study, such that integrating climate finance 
into the EU (and potentially national) budget(s) could be regarded as a missed opportunity for 
transferring previously occurred individual factual and constructivist learning to the organiza-
tional level. Instead, where expediency trumps deliberation, the scope for learning may re-
main constrained.  
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